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ABSTRACT
Despite being assailed for decades by disability activists and
disability studies scholars spanning the humanities and social
sciences, the medical model of disability—which conceptualizes
disability as an individual tragedy or misfortune due to genetic or
environmental insult—still today structures many cases of
patient–practitioner communication. Synthesizing and recasting
work done across critical disability studies and philosophy of
disability, I argue that the reason the medical model of disability
remains so gallingly entrenched is due to what I call the “ableist
conflation” of disability with pain and suffering. In an effort to
better equip healthcare practitioners and those invested in health
communication to challenge disability stigma, discrimination, and
oppression, I lay out the logic of the ableist conflation and
interrogate examples of its use. I argue that insofar as the
semiosis of pain and suffering is structured by the lived
experience of unwelcome bodily transition or variation,
experiences of pain inform the ableist conflation by preemptively
tying such variability and its attendant disequilibrium to disability.
I conclude by discussing how philosophy of disability and critical
disability studies might better inform health communication
concerning disability, offering a number of conceptual distinctions
toward that end.
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For it would be better to die once and for all than to suffer pain for all one’s life.
Ἰώ:… κρεῖσσον γὰρ εἰσάπαξ θανεῖν // ἢ τὰς ἁπάσας ἡμέρας πάσχειν κακῶς—Aeschylus1
Our aversion to the very idea of being disabled forestalls our understanding the disabled from
their perspective.—Anita Silvers2
Although we awake to life in profound bodily dependency, although we live out our bodies
in a permanent state of vulnerability and variability, and although through age, if nothing
else, we return to originary states of dependency, we have come to fear bodily change.3
That is to say, we are often averse to, if not fearful of, uncontrolled, unexpected, and
unwelcomed bodily transitions. Modern medicine acts as a therapy for the soul by
taking this fear at face value and mitigating it through genetic intervention, surgical
repair, and myriad forms of prevention and care. Health communication reveals
volumes about such worries and fears over the body’s ﬂuid nature, the numerous
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effects of which we have only recently in English come to categorize as “disabilities.” But
do we really know what this term means? And are the fears to which some attach it jus-
tiﬁed? Are they grounded in the experiences they purport to be about? Does not one’s
interpretation of the meaning of “disability” hold enormous sway over how one experi-
ences one’s body, its transformations, and the choices one makes about it? Does not
that interpretation alter, amplify, or even erase fears that can drive medical decision-
making and the ease or difﬁculty of communication about it? What if a vast range of
medical thinking and communication about disability is based not in its lived experience,
but in misguided aversion to and fear of it?
Despite being assailed for decades by disability activists and disability studies scholars
spanning the humanities and social sciences, the medical model of disability still today
structures too many cases of patient–practitioner communication.4 This model conceptu-
alizes disability as an individual tragedy or misfortune due to genetic or environmental
insult. Tellingly, the incorporation of disability education into medical training is itself
a point of contestation. This is especially true with regard to scholarship in critical disabil-
ity studies, which both begins from a critique of the medical model of disability and also
interrogates multiple theoretic presumptions in medicine more generally.5 Unsurprisingly,
people with disabilities report significantly higher inadequacies in patient–practitioner
communication.6 A contributing factor to this situation is the relative lack of engagement
between critical disability studies and health communication studies, and the overarching
aim of this article is to demonstrate the ways in which the former might enrich the latter.
Synthesizing and recasting work done across critical disability studies and philosophy
of disability, I argue that the reason the medical model of disability remains so gallingly
entrenched is because of what I call the “ableist conflation”: the conflation of disability
with pain and suffering.7 On this logic, disability is both a sign and cause of existential
dis-ease and dis-order. In an effort to better equip healthcare practitioners and all those
invested in health communication to challenge disability stigma, discrimination, and
oppression, I first lay out the logic of the ableist conflation and interrogate examples of
its use.8 I argue that insofar as the semiosis of pain and suffering is structured by the
lived experience of unwelcome bodily transition or variation, experiences of pain
inform the ableist conflation by preemptively tying such variability and its attendant exis-
tential disequilibrium to disability. I conclude by discussing how philosophy of disability
and critical disability studies might better inform health communication concerning dis-
ability, and I offer a number of conceptual distinctions toward that end, especially as they
might combat the ableist conflation and disability stigma.
Health communication and disability
Health communication scholarship has addressed multiple issues related to communi-
cation and narration about disability. This research includes studies on the manner in
which medical students communicate with and about people with disabilities;9 how
such communication occurs within families;10 how perceptions about disability affect
medical decision-making;11 and how assumptions about disability inform health com-
munication and medical education as a whole.12 From a broader philosophy of disability
lens, it becomes clear that much of this research revolves around navigating—or failing to
navigate—the multiple meanings of disability. What do I mean by this?
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The term “disability” picks out an extremely complex set of phenomena. Given its
complexity, there are debates over nearly every aspect of its meaning. For example, is
disability a natural kind—does it refer to a real set of characteristics or traits of
people or other things in the world?13 If disability is instead a way or mode of
being, “what sort of being is it?”14 Does “disability” refer to an intrinsically positive,
negative, or neutral experience or set of experiences?15 Is “disability” in fact more a
social than individual phenomenon?16 If so, with respect to all or only some forms
of disability? How do intellectual as opposed to physical disabilities alter the lived
experience and potential meanings of disability?17 How have misguided assumptions
about disability and intellectual disability in particular restricted political rights?18
Does disability name a minority identity?19 Is disability political, and if so, in what
ways?20 How is one to understand and communicate about invisible disabilities,
especially given disability’s shifting, situated, and diverse global politics?21 How is
chronic pain or illness different from what we think of as disability?22 How is the his-
torical oppression of people with disabilities related to understandings and governance
of sexual activity?23 How have people with disabilities been disproportionately surveilled
and monitored?24 How do questions about disability intersect with those of gender and
sexuality?25 With race?26 With education?27 With class?28 With the predominance of
cultural and institutional ableism?29 How do some with disabilities pass as able-
bodied or neurotypical?30 How widely has the meaning and conceptualization of disabil-
ity changed over history and across cultures?31 How have varying historical perceptions
of disability become determinate for the meaning of lives defined by it today?32 And
what does such historical variance teach us?
How one responds to these questions will fundamentally shape how one communicates
about disability. Ultimately, it will affect how one thinks about and treats others, including
oneself. Put bluntly, a medical practitioner who uncritically conceptualizes disability will
actively, albeit likely unwittingly, contribute to disability stigma and to the epistemic and
practical injustices that people with disabilities have historically and still face today.33 Take
as an example the article, “How Do I Ask About Your Disability?” The authors frame the
import of their study by noting that “individuals with disabilities have greater needs for
patient-informed health care, yet describe health care professionals making erroneous
assumptions about their goals, aspirations, and abilities, which impact both communi-
cation and treatment.”34 Yet, a version of the widely disparaged medical model of disabil-
ity is deployed uncritically throughout, and there is no substantive engagement with the
numerous meanings of disability detailed above.35 Because the very conceptualization of
disability in the article is itself problematic, the improvements in interpersonal communi-
cation a practitioner might achieve through the study are marginal at best. In short,
without a critical analysis of disability, one will likely end up unintentionally conceptua-
lizing disability on faulty grounds, ultimately contributing to rather than countering or
mediating disability stigma.
This is one reason why a critical disability studies approach has the potential to sig-
nificantly enrich health communication studies: it provides practitioners with a more
substantive understanding of the ways in which they can undo and actively resist
unjust epistemic and material practices. I will now turn to assail one of the main con-
ceptual errors in health communication about disability: the ableist conflation of disabil-
ity with pain and suffering.
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The ableist conflation
Wherever operative, the ableist conflation flattens communication about disability to
communication about pain, suffering, hardship, disadvantage, morbidity, and mortality.
For example, in a 2015 Boston Globe op-ed, Steven Pinker proclaims,
Some say that it’s simple prudence to pause and consider the long-term implications of [bio-
medical] research before it rushes headlong into changing the human condition. But this is
an illusion … slowing down research has a massive human cost. Even a one-year delay in
implementing an effective treatment could spell death, suffering, or disability for millions
of people.36
Setting aside the question-begging nature of this argument, Pinker ﬁnds that death, suffer-
ing, and disability are so similar that they can be listed together as experiences no one
wants and obviously so. Imagine making sense of one’s life when one is labeled “disabled”
under such circumstances. Imagine the limitations thereby placed upon communication
about it from the outset. Insofar as Pinker paints his argument in the veneer of
common sense, a person living with a disability who disagrees with the aspiration of “elim-
inating disability” begins on the defensive about their experience of their own life.
Pinker’s understanding is in step with the majority of transhumanists and posthuma-
nists. Thinkers and activists who claim that title typically seek the total eradication of
“disability” from the human species as a central goal.37 Yet they rarely, if ever, critically
reflect upon their use of that term, not to mention the copious literatures that engage it,
whether through reflective or empirical research. Trans- and posthumanists, like Pinker,
conflate a whole range of corporeal variabilities categorized as “disabilities” not only
with pain and suffering, but with disease, illness, and death. To be fair, Pinker does
not explicitly claim in the quote above that disability is in and of itself a type of suffer-
ing. Yet, the rhetorical force of his series “death, suffering, or disability” could not be
clearer: these phenomena are similar in that no one desires to experience them. Pinker
capitalizes on this assumed homogenization to further the putative urgency in respond-
ing to their “threat” to progress.38
In another section from the same piece, he writes,
Have you had a friend or relative who died prematurely or endured years of suffering from a
physical or psychiatric disease, such as cancer, heart disease, Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s, Par-
kinson’s, or schizophrenia? Of course you have: the cost of disease is felt by every living
human. The Global Burden of Disease Project has tried to quantify it by estimating the
number of years lost to premature death or compromised by disability. In 2010 it was 2.5
billion, which means that about a third of potential human life and flourishing goes to
waste. The toll from crime, wars, and genocides does not come anywhere close.39
Unlike the grammatical ambiguity of the former quote, disease, disability, and (premature)
death are here treated interchangeably. Disability is rhetorically paralleled with death,
crime, war, and genocide. Disability, as Pinker understands it, is a form of constitutive
pain and suffering. He not only commits the ableist conﬂation but then employs its
logic to argue against ethical reﬂection that would halt or slow the future of biomedical
technologies. Worry about risk on your own time, Pinker seems to imply, because our
global society must immediately continue reducing disability, disease, and death. Here,
the force of the ableist conﬂation to foreclose the meanings of disability—and, ultimately,
the meaning of being human as such—is on full display. It is this bold-faced linking of
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disability with pain, of which death is ultimately a species, that achieves such a spectacle of
uncritical thinking about disability.
How, then, would one learn to decouple disability from pain and suffering?40 How
might a medical practitioner—whether working in triage or palliative care, oncology or
obstetrics—work against the disability stigma Pinker displays and the ableist conflation
undergirding it? How can practitioners identify, interpret, and contest their own
ableism and that of their patients in a way that engenders contestation of the historical
discrimination and devaluation experienced by people with disabilities? How, in short,
can communication between practitioners and patients better support justice for people
with disabilities? As I explain in more detail below, insofar as humans widely identify
and conceptualize pain and suffering as experiences to be avoided, phenomena that
bring about pain and suffering are normatively disparaged—they are understood as nega-
tive. The social ostracization of those who seek out pain is one example of this.41 There is,
however, a large literature across multiple humanistic and social scientific fields that
demonstrate the many errors of associating disability with pain, suffering, and disadvan-
tage.42 Understanding and working against the logic of the ableist conflation, I believe, is a
necessary (though not thereby sufficient) step in improving practitioner–patient com-
munication concerning disability, as well as communication about disability in general.
Although it can take many forms, I will suggest that the ableist conflation involves at
least the following four claims:
(1) Disability is conceptualized as a lack or deprivation of a natural good.
(2) Deprivation of potential natural goods is considered a harm.
(3) Harm is understood to cause or be a form of pain and suffering.
(4) Given 1–3, disability is coextensive with (weak version) or causes (strong version)
pain and suffering (linked with or even leading to death).43
This is the basic formula, I contend, that best explains the continued entrenchment of the
medical model of disability and what could be called “medical intuitions” about disability.
This is the formula that best explains disability’s widespread cultural disparagement, from
inspiration porn to disability hate crimes.44 This is the formula that best explains the basic
logic of “I’d rather be dead than disabled.”45 Note that given 1–4 disability evokes a similar
response of negativity and urgency of intervention, and one would expect a person concep-
tually imbued with the ableist conﬂation to communicate about them in similar ways.46
People say, “I’m so sorry,” to someone in pain, just as those without disability education
do to many with disabilities—and often regardless of whether or not the person is visibly
in pain at all. People often valorize and take inspiration from those who overcome pain,
just as those without disability education do when enjoying and propagating inspiration
porn.47 The countervailing logics of pity and inspiration make perfect sense if grounded
in the ableist conﬂation.
To address all of the philosophical questions that the terms and formulations of the
ableist conflation raises is impossible here. My aim is only to suggest that something like
these sets of ideas and assumptions inform ableist intuitions and function as a disturbingly
resilient habit of ableist thinking. The ableist conflation functions in part through capitaliz-
ing upon the ambiguity of its terms; it grips common sense by leaving the meaning of dis-
ability, harm, pain, and suffering all uncritically underdefined.
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I would further argue that there are assumptions and inferences based in the ableist
conflation that are more pernicious than others, specifically the ones that engage in
eugenic discourse. One could imagine a set of working assumptions that underwrite a
eugenic form of the ableist conflation as follows:
(1) Disability is considered a lack or deprivation of a (natural) good.
(2) Deprivation of potential goods is considered a harm.48
(3) Harm is understood to cause or be a form of pain and suffering.
(A) The aim of politics and ethics is to maximize flourishing, in part by reducing
harms and ameliorating pain and suffering.
(4) Disability causes or is concomitant with pain and suffering (given 1–3).
(A) Individuals and the state are justified in ending or otherwise curtailing the lives
of people with disabilities in certain cases (given 1–4).
The infamous conclusion of the United States’ 1927 Buck v. Bell case put this eugenic form
of the ableist conﬂation quite clearly:
The public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices… in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if …
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.… Three gen-
erations of imbeciles are enough.49
To maximize ﬂourishing (including that of the State as a body), the State can forcibly call
upon the “unﬁt” to not reproduce because doing so would constitute a harm against the
State. For Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., certain forms of disability not only trump
liberal egalitarianism but call upon a liberal society to end their genetic future. A most
illiberal inference, indeed.50
With the hope of better understanding why disability might have ever become linked
with pain and suffering in the first place, I will now turn to a discussion of how the
reinforcement of the ableist conflation is structured by the lived experience of pain.
The semiosis of pain
Inquiries concerning pain run into an initial aporia. The pain of torture, the pain of
unrequited love, or the pain of a life lived with chronic pain—are these not qualitatively
similar only at the most abstract level, if at all? Could not only “reasoning from another
world,” to borrow Fyodor Dostoevsky’s acerbic phrase, produce similarity across such dis-
parate cases?51 As tempting as this claim may be, I will argue that the laxity of language
alone cannot account for the intricate semantic orchestration arranged by the polyphony
of phenomena we describe with the term “pain.”
For example, note the strikingly wide definition of pain given by the International
Association for the Study of Pain (IASP):
an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue
damage, or described in terms of such damage .… It is unquestionably a sensation in a
part or parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional
experience. Experiences which resemble pain but are not unpleasant, e.g., pricking, should
not be called pain.52
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Part of the complexity of the deﬁnition is due to the fact that even in solely biological or
neurophysiological terms, it is difﬁcult to determine with substantive precision what does
and does not qualify as pain.53 Arguably, the semantic and semiotic problem with pain is
not simply a quirk or mistake of language, but reﬂects the fact that the experience of pain
itself is profoundly ambiguous and diffuse.
David Sinclair notes,
The pain spots in the skin are so densely distributed that it is almost impossible to find a
touch, cold, or warm spot which is not also sensitive to pain. Again, pain is unique in that
it can be produced by almost any kind of stimulus, provided it is intense enough.… Some-
times pain behaves as if the pure sensation were the dominant factor [and other times] the
“affective component.”54
The deﬁnition from the IASP and the commentary by Sinclair might lead one to be sus-
picious of a universal deﬁnition of pain, much less a rigorous deﬁnition. I wish to focus
here less on the meaning of pain and more on the way in which it comes to have a
meaning associated with disability experience: by focusing one’s attentional ﬁeld on
one’s body.
The underlying logic of medical diagnosis is based upon semiotics: symptoms are
understood as signs that refer to physical or psychological causes.55 Thus, diagnosis
necessarily relies in part upon semiosis: the process whereby an object functions as a
sign.56 In order to understand how disability might become conflated with pain and suf-
fering, I contend, one must first achieve clarity concerning the semiosis of pain, on how
pain comes to have a meaning affiliated negatively and suspiciously with disability. To
answer this, I will turn to semiotics. For Charles Sanders Peirce, one of the foundational
figures in the field of semiotics, there are three basic components of the semiotic process:
the sign, the object, and the interpretant:
A sign, or representamen [a thing that represents], is something which stands to somebody
for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind
of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it
creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object.57
What is crucial for Peirce is that the triadic relation between sign, object, and interpretant
is “genuine,” that is, in no way composed of dyadic relations. No piece can be thought
without the other two pieces. What is more, each triad is constitutively chained or
linked to an inﬁnite set of other triadic possibilities. That is to say, any given sign can
become an object of a different sign (thus constituting a different triad) just as any
given interpretant can become a sign or object in some other triad. Meaning arises not
through direct, unmediated relations of experience and language, but through the
ongoing, ambiguous interplay of a multiplicity of discursive practices. This suggests that
how we conceive and communicate about things is far more malleable than we might
expect.
The key to a semiotic act for Peirce revolves around the question of reference, which is
to say, the question of showing or indicating—a sign is something that stands to somebody
for something.58 The essence of a sign, then, is its deictic or indicational character. Unlike
Peirce, in Martin Heidegger’s early existential semiotics, while the indicational character of
the semiotic act is important, he places greater emphasis on the set of relations out of
which and in which such a relationship could arise in the first place.59 For Heidegger,
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semiosis always involves one’s entire world, the totality of references in and out of which
one finds things meaningful. It is through this totality that the singular meaning of a given
experience emerges.
Furthermore, a sign is always understood more specifically in terms of its usefulness
—for some particular goal or end—signs orient us in the world. The signpost, for
example, relates to a certain place or direction in a context; it orients one to that
specific place and not another. If pain is like a signpost—a signal to something—
then to what is it pointing? When the phenomenon of pain is broadened from a
purely biomedical and clinical context, its meaning ranges over any situation
wherein one is led to heed one’s body. Insofar as experiences of pain are uncontrolled
and unwelcome, pain has become a sign of being made into an object, being forced to
take oneself as an object, and even forced from the possibility of subjective reflection,
as in cases of extreme pain. Pain is thus limitrophic; it operates at the borders, the
edges, of our being. It is, as Andrew Mitchell puts it, a “wound of relation.”60 Pain
is a sign that we are beholden to the world to the point of death. Accordingly, as a
sign that reveals the depth and character of the ephemerality of one’s being-in-the-
world, pain is the ultimate sign of mortality.
It is at this point that one can see why tying the meaning of disability to that of pain
is so damning for all those with disabilities. Insofar as one fears death, one has good
and profoundly motivating reasons to fear and avoid pain precisely in light of the
stakes of its semiosis. If one then conflates experiences of disability with pain and
thereby mortality, then it is no wonder that people say and think, “I’d rather be
dead than disabled.”61 It is in large part due to the ableist conflation that people
with disabilities experience such stigma, disparagement, and misunderstanding—to
the point that they are entirely left out of models of flourishing. As I hope to have
already shown, disability is, upon critical reflection, neither a species of pain, nor suf-
fering, nor is it coextensive with either. Disability does not necessarily reveal one’s
mortality. Disability reveals corporeal variability. Disability reveals the mutability and
flexibility of life’s effulgence.
Corporeal variability needs to be renarrated to contrast the dominant assumptions of
the ableist conflation. Experiences of disability attest to a wide and positive range of
meaning-making. For example, those in Deaf culture—who understand the experience
of deafness not as audiological loss, but as a cultural identity based in practices of
signing—find no ontological wounding at all in their experience of disability.62 Some
born with nonphenotypical limb formations would say the same—nothing about their
“disability” signifies a wound of relation, except insofar as societal factors contribute to
their mistreatment or lack of equal access to social goods. It is a mistake to think that
social inequities are inevitable and anchor one to a life of pain, suffering, and death.
Pain is a normative guillotine.63 Following Heidegger, the semiotic conflation of dis-
ability is a worlded phenomenon. That is to say, if the semiosis of pain is taken to indi-
cate the possibility of the collapse of meaning and life through death, then any
phenomenon linked to pain will be conceptualized as to-be-avoided. When disability is
linked to pain through the ableist conflation, the death knell is sounded for understand-
ing disability in the actual, wide, and variable range that induces its many positive,
expected, and gainful forms as it expresses the variable constitution of the rhizomatic
course of a human life well lived.
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Dismantling the ableist conflation
SusanWendell has argued, both in her seminal work The Rejected Body and in later pieces,
that disability studies needs to take more account of the stigmas and oppressions faced by
those with chronic illness and/or chronic pain—the so-called “unhealthy disabled” who do
not represent “the paradigmatic personwith a disability who is healthy disabled and perma-
nently and predictably impaired.”64 One could, at this point, still be unconvinced. Isn’t
cystic fibrosis very difficult to deal with?What about “mental illnesses,” like schizophrenia,
whose lived experienced is articulated in terms of suffering?65 The still unconvinced might
say: Wouldn’t one rather walk than not? Wouldn’t one rather talk than not? To name the
ableist conflation of disability with pain and suffering as an error of thinking is not to say
that there are no cases of disability that are concomitant with experiences of pain and suf-
fering.On the contrary, there are longstanding and ongoing debateswithin disability studies
and philosophy of disability about the meaning, import, and turbulent politics of dis-
tinguishing between unhealthy disability and healthy disability.
Yet, the epistemic work involved in making such a distinction, I think, is a crucial, albeit
initial, step in avoiding the errors of the ableist conflation. What if all health communi-
cation and medical professionals, all bioethicists and philosophers, and all politicians
and global leaders made this distinction? What would it mean to carefully and consistently
differentiate between such experiences of disability?
Following decades of work in disability studies and philosophy of disability, the follow-
ing forms of disability should, at minimum, be distinguished:
congenital vs. noncongenital
healthy vs. unhealthy
visible vs. invisible
worldcreating vs. nonworldcreating
trauma-induced vs. nontrauma-induced
suffered vs. nonsuffered66
My hope is that by presenting these distinctions in such a broad and schematic way, it assists
practitioners, in particular, to avoid many of the conceptual errors that seem so stubbornly
entrenched across health communication. For example, cystic ﬁbrosis is an unhealthy dis-
ability insofar as its ensuing inhibition of lung function creates signiﬁcant and corporeally
intrinsic difﬁculties and pains. On the contrary, the congenital “lack” of one’s right hand, for
example, is a healthy disability insofar as the primary difﬁculties one encounters will likely
be due to the world being contingently crafted for people with two hands. If one has ﬁbro-
myalgia or chronic pain or another sort of invisible disability, one must often pass as able-
bodied. One’s experiences will differ notably in certain respects from one with a visible dis-
ability like aphenotypical limb formation of an extremity.67
With respect to the fourth distinction, blindness is one example of aworldcreating disabil-
ity. Life writings and memoirs report people experiencing blindness as a total, rich, and
unique form of living in the world, not one invariably defined by lack in relation to the phe-
notypical “norm.”68 If one is congenitally sighted and becomes blind through a traumatic
event, one’s experience will be expectedly different in instructive ways. It will take time to
experience blindness as worldcreating and, depending upon a multitude of factors ranging
from one’s attitude, level of disability education, and societal context, one may or may not
come to experience it in such a manner at all. One will likely never come to experience it
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thusly if one fails to shed the ableism intowhichwe are all inculcated, albeit very differentially
based upon our lived context. The noncongenital transition to the “disability” of blindness
will invariably be experienced as a difficulty, but the resulting form of life is not thereby
intrinsically negative. We often understand that the transition from state X to state Y may
be unpleasant and suffered, despite the fact that neither state X or state Y is necessarily nega-
tive in and of itself (puberty, old age, peak fitness, etc.). Given the evidence available, this
insight should be applied to cases of transition into states of disability as well.
Aging, depending upon the characteristics in question, can be experienced relatively
gracefully or starkly. If accelerated or traumatic, one’s experience of the “normal” pro-
cesses in question can be fundamentally different from one who more slowly, knowingly,
and lithely transitions into such experiences. It cannot be overstated how much one’s
understanding of the transitions of one’s body bears upon one’s judgment of that experi-
ence, whether traumatically induced or not. With respect to the final distinction, if one is
obsessed with beauty and youth, one can, for example, even suffer aging, despite it being a
natural and inevitable process. More gravely, if one lives in chronic pain, one experiences a
form of disability significantly different than forms that are not necessarily concomitant
with pain. That is to say, chronic pain names a form of disability that is almost by defi-
nition suffered. Having said this, what is stated here is admittedly insufficient with
respect to the profound variance of experiences and understanding of the many forms
of disability. I highlight here the utilization of these conceptual distinctions to help
begin a renarration of the meaning of disability across health communication and practice.
Without disability education, we are curiously driven by fear in the interpretation of
our fundamental corporeal variability. Simply that one experiences a given bodily vari-
ation or transition as an experience of suffering does not in and of itself mean that
such an experience should automatically be judged as normatively negative by oneself,
healthcare professionals, or ethicists.69 The semiosis of pain discussed above acts as a back-
drop to definitively judge the value and fate of a life. When the distinctions above are
made, the ableist conflation loses its preemptive and uncritical power, and the expansive
breadth of lives worth living with disability comes to the fore. This transformation in the
conceptualization of disability provides the first step for practitioners to address wide-
spread disability stigma, discrimination, and oppression, including the inertia of “compul-
sory able-bodiedness,” as Rober McRuer has aptly put it.70
Health humanities and the legacies of ableism
Rita Charon, among others, has argued for the import of medical/health humanities as an
integral component of primary medical education. “Sickness calls forth stories,” she
writes, and it is because sickness is invariably conceived in terms of story and narrative
that practitioners must learn to be adept interpreters.71 By linking certain forms of disability
to pain, suffering, sickness, and death through an uncritical conceptualization of pain’s
semiosis, the lives and stories of people with disabilities are in too many cases considered
to be pitiful, to be undesirable, or to constitute a life not worth living—even to the point
of warranting or sanctioning death. It is incumbent upon those in health communication
to listen to these stories better—to listen to the largest group of marginalized people. Yes,
to reprise a fact that should be known by all, people with disabilities are the largest minority
group in the world.72
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Numerous disability communities and cultures, such as those in the Neurodiversity
movement or in Deaf culture, provide uniquely rich and valuable ways of knowing and
being. I have suggested that one of the more important ways for a practitioner to
combat disability stigma is by decoupling disability from pain and actively educating
patients and oneself about the multiplicity and richness of disability experiences and dis-
ability communities. Combating disability stigma means learning how to interpret ableism
and the ableist conflation at work in stories of disability, in stories about fear or resilience
in the face of illness, and in all storytelling and communication about the myriad experi-
ences of bodily variation. Whether captured in the thought “I’d rather be dead than
disabled,” a thought still far too present in the atmosphere of patient–practitioner inter-
actions, or captured in globally negative attitudes towards disability, healthcare pro-
fessionals have a unique power and voice to support disability justice. I hope that by
clarifying the structure of the ableist conflation, I have offered practitioners a tool to
better address and help rectify the injustices and stigmas faced by people with disabilities.
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